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ANNEX 1 A 
 
 
 1 
“Our whole life is but a greater and longer childhood.” 
Benjamin Franklin 
 
 
      “There is a garden in every childhood, an enchanted place where colors are brighter, the 
air softer, and the morning more fragrant than ever again.”  
 Elizabeth Lawrence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For my children  
 2 
1 Introduction 
1.1 It takes a village 
Whilst human communities in our post-modern, post-industrial age have demonstrably 
changed, the principle famously espoused by this African proverb remains the same:  
indeed, it may be stated that it takes an international community to raise a child – restricted 
not only to the parents or the state.  Do children have moral rights as well as the positive 
rights recognised in international human rights law; and if so, who are the duty-bearers 
towards children, are only a couple of the questions which are considerably debated in 
studies of children.  Not surprisingly perhaps, international human rights discourse and 
practice are not immune to such tensions.  Children‟s human rights represent a new – and 
still contested – development in the broader field of post-Second World War international 
human rights. This thesis considers the ways that the international human rights framework 
has been applied to children, specifically through an analysis of the need for an optional 
protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
1
. I begin by considering the 
philosophical underpinnings and justifications for children‟s moral rights, in order to apply 
them to their human rights with a view to strengthening the basis from which a claim for a 
complaints procedure can be made. More than almost any other domain of rights, 
children‟s rights have been hotspots for debates about the existence of and nature of rights. 
Addressing the extension of human rights frameworks to children thus raises wide-ranging 
questions about rights, including: debates about paternalism; „will‟ or „choice‟ versus 
„interest‟ theories; and the extent to which such issues are effectively addressed or resolved 
in international human rights law and practice.  James Nickel‟s nonconsequentialist 
framework for justifying human rights will then be applied as an alternative way of 
grounding the rights of children in the context of international human rights specifically. 
 
I then proceed to survey the field of international human rights law, to examine the extent 
to which children‟s rights are effectively protected by the treaty bodies, followed by an 
                                                 
1 I used the acronym “CROC” in the title for rhetorical purposes, but “CRC” or “The Convention” will 
henceforth be used. 
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analysis of the CRC as the concrete expression of the rights of children in the international 
legal framework.  I will examine the effectiveness of the CRC through the lens of the need 
for a complaints mechanism, facilitated by a third optional protocol to the Convention.  
Here, the added value and assumptions of individual complaints procedures will be 
evaluated and applied to children.  Comparison will be made to the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (OP-
CEDAW): its history and justifications. 
 
These considerations are highly pertinent given the decision by the Human Rights Council 
(HRC) in March, to extend the mandate of the intergovernmental Working Group to begin 
drafting an optional protocol.  The first session of the Working Group is expected to take 
place in December 2010 and the new instrument could be adopted by the end of 2011.  
This thesis provides a critical background for academics, practitioners and diplomats to 
contribute to the process of the drafting of an optional protocol to the CRC and thus speaks 
to the reasons states should ratify such an instrument. 
 
“The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child was, at its adoption, a 
pioneering global treaty embracing the full range of human rights – civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural – in one treaty with a unified monitoring body.”2  In its 
provision of socio-economic rights to children, it recognised and reaffirmed the 
interdependence and indivisibility of rights, before its express acknowledgment in the 
Vienna Declaration and Program of Action in 1993.  The CRC is extraordinarily 
comprehensive in its scope, and “[b]y its genesis, scope, content and very existence, this 
Convention ranks as a landmark in efforts on behalf of children.”3  Despite its landmark 
beginning, it is now the only international human rights treaty with a mandatory reporting 
                                                 
2 Geraldine Van Bueren, 'Committee on the Rights of the Child: Overcoming Inertia in This Age of No 
Alternatives', in Malcolm Langford (ed.), Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and 
Comparative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 569-87. 
3 Sharon Detrick, Jaap Doek, and Nigel Cantwell, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: A 
Guide to the "Travaux Préparatoires" (Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff, 1992) at 27. 
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procedure which does not have, in addition, an existing or draft communications 
procedure.
4
 This has been seen by some to be a serious shortcoming of the human rights 
mechanisms of the treaty bodies more generally, being discriminatory against children. In 
this thesis I explore the issue as to whether there is a need for an optional protocol (OP) to 
the CRC whereby individual children have standing to bring a complaint before the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC Committee).  As pioneering as an international 
human rights bestowing instrument as the CRC was, back in the 1990s, the very real 
question as to its effectiveness in 2010 begs to be addressed.  The rights of children are still 
flagrantly abused the world over, often without effective national avenues through which 
children can seek redress for their violated rights.  Though technically, as individuals, 
children can seek redress for any alleged breaches under the various core international 
human rights conventions, their actual use of this system is exceptionally limited.  Even 
then, the breach of any one of the full scope of rights encapsulated in the CRC, which are 
unique to this child-specific instrument, such as the right to play and the right to protection 
and abuse, are not capable of adjudication by any one of the committees of the other core 
international human rights instruments. 
  
                                                 
4 At present, five of the human rights treaty bodies (CERD, CCPR, CAT, CEDAW and CRPD) may under 
particular circumstances, consider communications from individuals alleging violations of their rights under 
the respective treaties. Some of them can undertake inquiries in cases of grave or systematic violations of 
the treaty in question (CAT, CEDAW, and CRPD). 
The Convention on Migrant Workers also contains a provision allowing individual communications to be 
considered by the CMW. This provision will become operative when ten States parties have made the 
necessary declaration under Article 77. 
Two instruments, which have not yet entered into force: the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearances, also provide for the examination of individual complaints. 
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2 Sources and Methodology 
The methodology I employ in my thesis is a combination of legal, philosophical and 
political.  I begin with an analysis of moral rights philosophies in the broader fields of 
philosophy, in order to compare it to the more specific framework of the philosophy of 
international human rights.  Here, I apply the Four Secure Claims as espoused by James 
Nickel, to children, in order to ground children‟s rights in the international human rights 
context. I interpret and apply these claims to children in light of the philosophical literature 
that I survey.  In doing so, my purpose is two-fold: firstly, in the hope that such research 
strengthens the basis from which a claim for a complaints mechanism to the CRC can be 
made, and secondly, informed by the belief that an understanding of the philosophy of 
children‟s rights can thwart the further ad hoc development of international human rights 
law concerning children.   It would be “idle to pretend that the answer to all this lies in 
theory [...] [b]ut we can and must believe that the state of childhood will be improved if we 
[...] transcend the rhetoric of international documents and domestic legislation and tease out 
the moral argument for the recognition of children‟s rights.”5 
 
The legal analysis in my thesis stems from my survey of international children' rights cases 
from three of the United Nations treaty bodies: the Human Rights Committee, the CEDAW 
Committee and the CERD Committee respectively.  Here, I analysed all of the cases 
brought before each of the respective committees, concerning children: either brought by, 
or on behalf of children themselves.  I present my findings in the sixth chapter of this thesis 
and interpret the need for a third optional protocol to the CRC in light of these 
conclusions.  
                                                 
5
 Michael Freeman, 'Taking Children's Rights More Seriously', in Philip Alston (ed.), Children, Rights, and the 
Law (London: Clarendon, 1992), 52-71 at 53. 
 6 
 
The political aspect of my methodology is reflected by the subject matter chosen – the 
policy-driven nature of such an endeavour – and the related sources.  That is to say, the 
drafting of an optional protocol – as an international human rights treaty – is a manifestly 
political one, initiated, drafted, signed and ratified by states.  I have sought not to lose sight 
of this diplomatic, pragmatic nature of the topic that I have chosen and the reality that in 
the end, it is the „state‟ that will ensure its success and political clout. Consequently, I 
examine sources related to the United Nations treaty bodies in order to discuss the pros and 
cons of an optional protocol, based on a comparison with the CEDAW and the arguments 
that the working groups have themselves discussed.  
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3 Philosophies of Children’s Rights 
3.1 Philosophies of rights and children 
3.1.1 Overview 
Although the CRC accords to children a wide range of positive rights, this does not 
translate into „moral‟ rights. The fact that children have positive rights – as enshrined in 
international human rights instruments, for example – does not settle the question of 
whether they do or should have moral rights. Indeed, the idea of children as rights holders 
(of what kinds, if any at all) has been subject to different kinds of philosophical criticism 
and the various debates shed light on both the nature and purpose of rights, and on the 
moral status of children.  It is to this that I now turn in order to humbly bridge the 
“unfortunate disjunction between theory and practice,” as the [i]deas of the theorists can 
obviously be of more practical assistance if translated into a set of legal principles which 
provides clear guidance over the extent to which children‟s rights can be fulfilled.”6  It is 
hoped that it is with a clearer understanding of the nuances of children‟s rights that the OP 
to CRC is drafted so as to ensure its effectiveness.  
 
“It has become of particular importance now that all those concerned with the 
principles of child law must come to terms with the fact that children are important 
rights-holders under the CRC […].  Indeed, without a clearer understanding of rights 
theory, there is a risk that children‟s challenges will be dealt with on an ad hoc basis 
and in an increasingly confused and inconsistent manner.”7 
                                                 
6 Jane Fortin, Children's Rights and the Developing Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 29. 
7 Ibid. at 29-30. 
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It was Karen Engle who famously wrote that the “international law of human rights has 
been built largely by its own criticism;”8 however, paradoxically at the same time it has for 
the most part managed to escape the critique of rights that have been levelled at moral 
rights theorists.
9
  Moral rights theorists have enunciated many theories as to the nature of 
rights, and its implications for children: namely, whether children can be described as 
rights-holders at all.  Liberationalist ideas, which had developed in the civil rights context 
of 1960s America, provide a good backdrop of arguments about children‟s rights: 
emphasising self-determination by granting autonomy to the child to the same extent as that 
of adults.  Many have critiqued the liberationalist “failure to accord sufficient attention to 
the physical and mental differences between childhood and adulthood”10 and this has led to 
a strong response in children‟s rights theory.  
3.1.2 Choice, Interest and Autonomy 
Definitions of rights themselves have had implications upon whether children can be 
described as rights-holders, and the concept of „choice‟ lies at the epicentre of the 
differences between the two main contenders: „choice’ (or „will’) theory on the one hand, 
and „interest’ theory on the other.  According to the former, people can only be described 
as rights-holders if they can exercise a choice over a given right; this theory “invests the 
importance of choice with such significance that it alone is capable of grounding all 
rights.”11  The implications of this seem obvious enough for children: children who are too 
young to choose and therefore claim rights, simply do not have rights.  Interest theorists on 
the other hand, such as MacCormick and Raz, respond with a competing view of rights 
uncoupling the centrality of choice from rights, arguing that the cart should not be placed 
before the horse as “rights need not be confined to those who can lay claim to or waive 
                                                 
8 Karen Engle, 'International Human Rights and Feminism: When Discourses Meet', Michigan Journal of 
International Law, 13 (1991-2) at 519-20. 
9
 Ibid. 
10 Fortin, Children's Rights and the Developing Law at 4. 
11
 Ibid. at 12. 
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them […] posit[ing] that a person has a right where his interests are protected in certain 
ways.”12 Children, like adults, have interests that need to be protected and such a rights-
model “fully accommodates the “view that children are no less precious because of their 
lack of adult capacities.”13  In her vast account of the theoretical perspectives, Fortin 
expresses her preference for the interest model as put forward by MacCormick, who 
describes a moral right as “a good of such importance that it would be wrong to deny it to 
or withhold it from any member of C (a given class)” due to its “arresting simplicity that 
many non-theorists may find attractive.”14 However, Fortin has also demonstrated this 
theory‟s drawbacks, that it does not effectively delineate which interests are capable of 
translating into rights,
15
 which goes to suggest that “agreement over a universally 
acceptable theory of rights for dependent children may always prove elusive.”16 
 
Like choice, the question of autonomy has been at the heart of the theories of children‟s 
rights, going back to the critiques of liberalist ideas who granted autonomy with utmost 
importance and centrality. Is a child capable of exercising autonomy and to what extent 
have plagued rights theories and critics thereof.   The flip-side of the autonomy coin is the 
need to restrict the autonomy of children, otherwise known as paternalism.  Raz, a theorist 
of the interest persuasion does not think these two are mutually exclusive and suggests that 
“it may be necessary to protect someone else, or to protect the coerced person‟s own long-
term autonomy, or some other interest.”17 This has direct implications for the CRC and the 
underlying principles of a potential OP.  That the CRC employs the use of a paternalistic 
welfare principle: the “best interests of the child” indicates that, already in international 
                                                 
12
 Ibid. at 13. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Ibid. at 14. 
15
 Ibid. at 15-17. 
16
 Ibid. at 14. 
17
 Ibid. at 21.  
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human rights law paternalism is considered as the appropriate way of addressing children. 
However, this does not negate criticism of its use, and the need to restrain paternalistic 
interventions is most lucidly expressed by Eekelaar in his seminal article.
18
  Eekelaar 
expresses concern at the indeterminacy of its use by the courts and proposes another 
method of decision-making to replace the best interests test, what he calls the concept of 
“dynamic self-determinism.”  According to this method (which is a “reconstruction of the 
„best interests‟ principle”) the objectivity from which the best interests of the child (as a 
principle) is determined
19
 needs to be supplemented with an additional element.  These 
“two modes, should operate in parallel,”20 such that accordingly, the presumption of a what 
is in a child‟s best interests is shifted from the decision-maker to the child: the 
“presumption is that the best response to whatever issue has arisen may lie within the child, 
even though the child may need direction to an accommodation with the social world 
surrounding it, rather than a manipulation of that social world to which that child is left to 
respond.”21  Rather than being only one of a number of other competing considerations, a 
child‟s views of what are in her own interests would instead be an important factor that 
must be considered.  This exercise of autonomy is dependent upon the child‟s competence, 
as acknowledged by Eekelaar; however, this new principle is not immune to potential 
misinterpretation as an issue may arise when “such views might suggest to some that 
sympathy with the concept that children are rights-holders dictates an inability to override 
children‟s wishes, because doing so thereby undermines their rights.”22 
                                                 
18
 John Eekelaar, 'The Interests of the Child and the Child's Wishes: The Role of Dynamic Self-Determinism', 
in Philip Alston (ed.), The Best Interests of the Child: Reconciling Culture and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 42-61. 
19
 Ibid. at 46-7. “By this method, the decision-maker draws on beliefs which indicate conditions which are 
deemed to be in the child’s interests *…+ one should not therefore dismiss lightly the possibility of making 
objective assessments of children’s interests.  But their reliability is difficult to determine…It is therefore 
necessary to introduce a second element into the decision-making process.” 
20
 Ibid. at 58. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Fortin, Children's Rights and the Developing Law at 24. 
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It would seem that the doctrinal confusion concerning vesting children with moral rights 
has not seeped its way into the international human rights paradigm, at least not to the same 
extent.  Although there appears to be a disconnect between moral theories of children‟s 
rights (philosophies of children‟s rights) and the instruments detailing children‟s human 
rights, it does not seem as self-aware.
23
  Jane Fortin, Professor of law who has published 
extensively in children‟s rights, has addressed the two differing frameworks, to argue that 
this is positive – that where children‟s rights theorists may fail, recourse may be had to the 
„rhetoric‟ of human rights, where the contested rights may be easily derived from existing 
instruments.  For Fortin, international human rights can be seen then as a more pragmatic 
way of advancing the interests and rights of children, where “the language or „rhetoric‟ of 
rights is a politically useful tool to ensure the achievement of certain goals for children,”24 
allowing one to sidestep the obstacles posed in the realm of moral philosophy.  The moral 
theorists working from within that said paradigm are not however considered in Fortin‟s 
study, due perhaps in part to the fact that they do not deal specifically with children. This 
absence of engagement with the theory within the framework of human rights can however, 
be debilitating, leading to an ad hoc accommodation of children within the system of 
protection.  What is needed, I would submit, are both approaches: clear justifications of the 
moral rights of children are a much-needed supplement to the deduction (or often mere 
assumption) of the existence of such moral rights from the legal instruments. 
25
 
 
Thus, the justification of rights in the domain of international human rights it operates in 
antithetically to the methodology of the moral rights theorists: where moral rights are 
derived from the legal principles, as opposed to deriving the latter from the moral 
                                                 
23
 This can be seen in the human rights theorists, such as James Nickel and Rawls, whose theories do not 
specifically address children, but take an adult-centric approach.   
24 Fortin, Children's Rights and the Developing Law at 17. 
25
 I propose to bridge this gap in theory by applying such a theory (here Nickel’s) to children, to test whether 
it can accommodate children. 
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principles (as is the case in the realm of moral rights theories).  An apt descriptive term of 
this process is „doctrinalism‟ – of deducing the rights from the instruments – within human 
rights discourse, which is employed as a persuasive tool to ground and justify the rights of 
groups, as articulated by Karen Engle.  Although Engle speaks with reference to women, 
this methodology can be seamlessly applied to children: 
Doctrinalists focus most of their efforts on interpreting international legal provisions 
so as to guarantee the particular rights they advocate.  In attempting to prove the 
guarantee of certain rights in positive law, many of these advocates follow a method of 
overkill: the more documents from which they can derive a right, the more likely its 
existence seems.  Although this method is quite common in public international law, 
its manifestation in [children]‟s human rights advocacy reflects a question about 
whether to pursue the „human rights of [children],‟ through an appeal to universal 
human rights law, or to pursue „[children]‟s rights,‟ through a more specific appeal to 
law that seems particular to [children]‟s situation.  Whether advocates are attempting 
to achieve the „human rights of [children]‟ or „[children]‟s rights‟ is a recurring theme 
throughout [children]‟s human rights advocacy.26 
Moving from the general rights framework then to the human rights paradigm, the 
philosophies attempting to ground human rights within the core of this system, so to speak, 
will be scrutinised.  The extent to which children are accommodated in this system will be 
considered.   
3.2 Philosophies of human rights and children 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Jacques Maritain, a member of the UNESCO Committee on the Theoretical Bases of 
human Rights reflected a colleague‟s remark that “we agree about the nature of rights but 
on condition that no one asks us why.”27 This neatly sums up the current state of children‟s 
rights in the international human rights framework.  Not being riddled by the same 
philosophical issues, as “[t]he jurisprudential doubts underlying the existence and scope of 
children‟s rights did not inhibit the efforts of those seeking to promote children‟s protection 
                                                 
26 I have replaced “women” with children in this quote, for emphasis. 
27 As quoted in Charles R. Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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in an international context,”28 one can say that in the international human rights context, 
children do have rights, as bestowed by the relevant legal instruments, but the issue of 
„upon what basis‟ does not seem to have been adequately explored. Discussions of the 
existence of children‟s rights seem to take place within the more general rights paradigm, 
as evidenced in Section 3.1 above, which does not necessarily directly transfer to the 
international human rights framework.  In this second framework, theorists have attempted 
to ground human rights philosophically in order to strengthen their claim and to make them 
more sustainable. Indeed “had it not been for the driving force of international human 
rights lawyers, ideas and theories about children‟s rights might have remained in the realms 
of intellectual speculation.  At first sight, the academics and legal practitioners concerned 
with the field of international human rights appear to be interested in entirely different 
concepts from the pure rights theories which concern the moral philosophers and jurists.”29 
As argued by Fortin, the differences between the two paradigms are “more apparent than 
real,” being “exacerbated by the different language they employ,” and each has influenced 
the other. Nickel comments on the influence that the human rights movement has had on 
moral theories, that it “has reflected – and perhaps even led – the expansion in the use of 
the idea of rights with moral and political discourse.”30   
3.2.2 Making Sense of Children’s Rights 
Borrowing from the title of James Nickel‟s book, I now apply Nickel‟s nonconsequentialist 
framework for justifying human rights to children, to strengthen the basis from which an 
individual complaints procedure can be made.  Nickel provides an ethical
31
 justification of 
human rights, defending a pluralistic conception of essential human interests
32
 “in order to 
                                                 
28 Fortin, Children's Rights and the Developing Law at 34. 
29 Ibid. 
30 James W. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2007) at 96. 
31 “Ethical” due to the fact that this view is informed by a substantive notion of the good. 
32 As opposed to other ethical philosophies, such as that of James Griffin, who argues that core values such 
as autonomy and liberty are essential to what if means to be a “functioning human agent” and that rights 
can be derived from the basic interests people have in realising these values: Griffin, 35. 
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give human rights greater power to resist folding when applied in nonstandard 
circumstances”33 and normative weight.   
3.2.2.1 Four Secure Claims 
If children cannot be neatly accommodated in a “modest”34 theory of justification of human 
rights – in what is prescribed as a “secure floor”, the minimal standards to lead a good life 
– the prognosis would seem somewhat disconcerting.  Nickel‟s test does not on the face of 
it directly apply to children; he makes mention of children as minorities, where he proposes 
a different (arguably more demanding) test
35
 whereby each minority right has to be derived 
from another universally accepted human right in order to be a valid human right.
36
  
However, as I will try to demonstrate, children fit nicely within the general framework 
proposed by Nickel, even if not directly intended by Nickel to apply to children.  Nickel 
proposes a Four Secure Claims model as a lowest common denominator justification for 
the existence of human rights.  In theory, this test should also apply to children, if they are 
to be considered as equal rights holders in the international framework for the protection of 
human rights. 
Nickel‟s proposed deontological moral considerations from which he builds his framework 
of justification – his Four Secure37 Claims – will now each be considered and applied to 
children‟s rights generally. I use Nickel‟s justificatory test to argue that children‟s rights 
are human rights. 
(i) A secure claim to have a life: 
                                                 
33 Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights  at 61. 
34 Ibid. at 62. 
35 Ibid. at 163. 
36 Though he states that are an “odd minority” Nickel claims that minority rights “fit into the family of 
human rights and can be supported by the same considerations that support human rights generally” in 
Ibid. at 160 -1. 
37 These four abstract rights are “secure” in two ways: they “do not have to be earned through membership 
or good behaviour” and their “availability to a person does not depend on that person’s ability to generate 
utility or other good consequences” in Ibid. at 62. 
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(ii) A secure claim to lead one‟s life; 
(iii)A secure claim against severely cruel or degrading treatment; and  
(iv) A secure claim against severely unfair treatment. 
3.2.2.2 Security of life and liberty 
The claim to have a life – to the “central human interest in security against actions of others 
that lead to one‟s death or loss of health”38 – applies to children.  This first claim is not 
dependent on the autonomy of the individual, and therefore does not bring into question its 
applicability to children, with respect to issues surrounding their will, choice or autonomy.  
Indeed, their inability to protect themselves when quite young may even provide a stronger 
reasoning from which to ground children‟s rights, as this claim includes the negative duties 
implied above, but also the positive duty “to assist people when they need help in 
protecting themselves against threats of murder and violence.”39 Children possess this 
claim just as much, if not to a greater degree in infancy, than adults. Further, this claim 
requires more than just being free from violence and harm.  It includes having a body that 
is capable of “self-supply” of the basic necessities: food, water, sleep and shelter.  It is 
when there are periods where self-supply is impossible, “typically childhood, illness, 
unemployment, disability and advanced old age” that a person (here the child) has a claim 
upon others to assistance.
40
  
3.2.2.3 Leading one’s life 
Unlike the first claim, the claim to leading one‟s life harks back to the ongoing debate in 
children‟s rights theories between choice/will and interest, autonomy, and agency.  Nickel 
proceeds by reflecting these very assumptions, that “[n]ormal adults are autonomous 
agents, and put a great value on continuing to be such.  They evaluate, choose, deliberate, 
and plan.”  Prima facie, this does not include children or operates to exclude them, as 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. at 63. 
 16 
demonstrated by the proviso, “normal adults.”  Nickel then continues by linking autonomy 
with liberty, it having both negative and positive aspects: “[…] yields claims to freedoms 
from slavery, servitude, and the use of one‟s life, time, or body without one‟s consent.  It 
also yields claims to liberties in the most important areas of choice such as occupation, 
marriage, association, movement and belief.”41  Can children make such choices, in these 
important matters, recalls the arguments in children‟s rights philosophies, reflecting the 
„choice‟ or „will‟ theory of rights. In grappling with the role of autonomy, the various 
theoretical rights models give it differing weight, with one theorist indicating that “whilst a 
child‟s capacity to plan and choose develops gradually, the choice theory seems to „commit 
us to the view that, prior to the acquisition of choosing skills, children have no rights‟.”42 
According to this theorist, no respite is offered by „interest‟ theories either, this being an 
argument considered by Fortin as weak in that children also have an interest in choice, and 
„interest‟ theories such as that of MacCormick can adequately accommodate children: 
“[b]ut surely this overlooks the fact that the interest theory of rights itself accommodates 
such a proposition, since children may indeed gradually acquire rights to self-determination 
based on their interest in choice, without having a right to complete autonomy.”43 There are 
echoes of this in Nickel‟s acknowledgment that a secure claim to liberty is “not just a claim 
to respect for or noninterference with one‟s liberty.  It is also a claim to assistance in 
protecting one‟s liberty, and for the creation and maintenance of social conditions in which 
the capacity for agency can be developed and exercised.”44  Here, this claim fits the bill for 
children, reflecting Freeman‟s formula – his notion of the "capacity for autonomy", where 
he suggests the need for objective limits placed on a child's autonomy – hence the notion of  
"liberal paternalism" which is his important contribution: 
 
                                                 
41 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
42 S. Brennan as quoted in Fortin, Children's Rights and the Developing Law at 20. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights  at 64 (emphasis added). 
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The question we should ask ourselves is this: what sorts of action or conduct would we 
wish, as children, to be shielded against on the assumption that we would want to 
mature to a rationally autonomous adulthood and be capable of deciding on our own 
system of ends as free and rational beings.
45
 
Thus, children, like adults, need the creation of spaces where their capacity for autonomy 
can be realised and can validly claim the right to lead their lives.  
3.2.2.4 Cruelty 
The secure claim against severely cruel or degrading treatment includes all forms of 
cruelty, from its simplest form imposing “severe pain on another person thoughtlessly or 
gleefully” thereby degrading a person, to more complicated forms that are “calculated  to 
degrade a person by suggesting, or bringing it about, that she is something that she and 
others will think base or low.”46  There is no reason why this cannot be justly claimed by 
children, who are more vulnerable to abuse or cruel treatment by virtue of their age and 
dependence. 
3.2.2.5 Unfair treatment 
Children as human beings are “keenly attuned to unfairness,” just as adults, and therefore 
have just as much a claim to not being subject to severe unfairness.  Children therefore also 
have a claim against severely unfair treatment, to the freedom from such treatment and a 
claim to individual and collective efforts to protection against it.  If as stated by Nickel, the 
“claim against unfair treatment plays an important role in supporting the universality of 
human rights, “ then there is especially strong arguments in favour of applying it to 
children.  
3.2.3 Conclusion 
Although not written specifically with children in mind, James Nickel‟s justificatory test 
for the existence of human rights can quite easily apply to children.  This is only one of 
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many competing justificatory theories within human rights discourse, yet I would venture 
to say that children may just as easily be situated within the parameters of other similar 
theories.   Taking children‟s rights more seriously, as argued by Freeman and others, will 
lead to a betterment in children‟s lives and contribute to their more effective representation 
in the international system of human rights protection.  Standing firmly on reasoned and 
justifiable rights can only improve this engagement more generally, and contribute more 
specifically to a sharpened tool of an optional protocol to the CRC facilitating individual 
complaints. 
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4 Assessing the Need for an Optional Protocol 
4.1 Travaux Préparatoires of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
The formal proposal to the UN that it adopt a convention on the rights of the child was 
tabled by the Government of Poland at the thirty-fourth session of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights (the predecessor to the Human Rights Council), in early 1978. It was not 
met with optimism, as indeed:  
 
[...] when the U.N: Secretary-General circulated the proposal to governments and 
international organisations for their „voices, observations and suggestions‟, the 
response was anything but enthusiastic.  Whilst few felt able officially to express 
doubts about the need for better ensuring access of children their fundamental rights – 
although many unofficially questioned the opportuneness of a convention in doing so – 
they did raised several concerns regarding the proposal as it stood.
47
 
 
Thus, by the time that the UN Commission on Human Rights met for its thirty-fifth session 
and decided to set-up an open-ended working group, it was with the view that the existing 
draft needed very close examination and much modification – not achievable by the time 
for the adoption of the Convention in 1979.  The drafting of the CRC took place over a 
period of ten years, and the consensual nature of the proceedings can be seen to contribute 
to this lengthy process.  On the other hand, this same factor contributed to the ultimate 
success of the Convention, upon completion.  The CRC boasts record-breaking rates of 
ratification with “no other United Nations human rights treaty [having] entered into force 
                                                 
47 Detrick, Doek, and Cantwell, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Guide to the 
"Travaux Préparatoires" at 21. 
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so quickly and been ratified by so many states in such a short period of time.”48  The 
Working Group operated on the basis of consensus, which means that “At no time during 
its work … was a proposal taken to a vote.”49  As highlighted by one particular 
commentator, and noted by the Secretary-General at the time, there was a “spirit of great 
co-operation not only amongst the non-governmental organizations but also among states‟ 
during the drafting stages of the CRC, to the extent that „a great number of state 
representatives became more involved with the subject of the treaty than is the norm.”50   
 
This lowest common denominator approach of adopting each provision by consensus can 
perhaps be one reason that accounts for the CRC‟s unprecedented ratification rate by 
States.  Conversely, the need for fostering such a positive atmosphere was identified by a 
couple of scholars as being precisely the reason against having a complaints procedure 
attached to the CRC; the Committee was limited to a monitoring procedure, which was 
based on “the idea of mutual help, support and co-operation.”51  The authors seem to fear 
the „over-judicialisation‟ of the Committee‟s powers, by arguing that the “Committee that 
was founded for this purpose does not only act in a controlling way but also in an advising 
way,” not being mindful of the status of the Committee‟s findings as “views” or 
expressions of opinion as opposed to binding legal rulings. 
 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also account for the success, as pointed out by 
one commentator: “in addition to engaging in the traditional lobbying activities of trying to 
secure the inclusion of specific provisions in the convention, the Ad Hoc Group did a great 
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51 Johan Vande Lanotte and Geert Goedertier, 'Monitoring Human Rights: Formal and Procedural Aspects', 
in Eugeen Verhellen (ed.), Monitoring Children's Rights (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996) at 82. 
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deal to stimulate awareness of the work that was being done on the draft convention.” The 
NGOs, represented by an Ad Hoc Group, organized and participated in many activities 
which “helped to make the convention become perhaps better known than many other 
specialized human rights instruments, and they probably also had a impact so far as its 
rapid ratification is concerned.”52 This influence also contributed to the substantive content 
of the CRC; the Ad Hoc NGO Group being able to identify more than thirteen substantive 
articles where they had “made a significant impact on the formulation, form or content. It 
was the breadth of expertise on which the NGO Group could draw, combined with its 
cohesion and careful preparation, that largely explains how it had an impact in so many of 
the fields covered by this unusually comprehensive treaty.”53 
 
However, despite attempts by the NGO Ad Hoc Group on the CRC which attempted to 
persuade states of the advantages of an individual petition system, the implementation 
mechanism adopted – that of a reporting procedure – did not include a 
communication/complaint procedure.  Due to this „lack of state support the proposals were 
never formally tabled and discussed in the sessions of the Working Group.‟54  
Undoubtedly, this was not the final word on the matter and there was nothing to prevent the 
re-emergence of the campaign for an optional protocol allowing for individual complaints 
to the CRC. 
4.2 Alternative Proposals? 
One commentator calls for the appointment of a Special Rapporteur for the Girl-Child, in 
response to the marginalisation of the girl-child in international human rights law, who can 
expedite the process and promotion of an ongoing intersectional approach that facilitates 
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girls‟ inclusion in international human rights law.55 Although focussing specifically on the 
girl child, Taefi‟s analysis highlights what is seen to be a significant shortcoming of the 
current system of children‟s rights protection.  Namely, that although children are covered 
by a number of treaties and treaty bodies (in this case, the CRC is juxtaposed with CEDAW 
respectively) neither one, argues the author, captures the unique positioning of 
marginalised children (here, girls) in international human rights law.  No suggestion is 
offered here for an OP to CRC, however, the utility of an OP in advancing the rights of 
women is acknowledged: “The creation of a separate convention for women led to formal 
recognition of violence against women as a human rights issue at the Vienna World 
Conference in 1993 [...] This impelled the acceptance of the indivisibility of human rights 
for women and led to the creation of separate enforcement mechanisms, such as the 
Optional Protocol to CEDAW which adds an individual right of petition (Article 7(4))”.56  
There is no reason why the same development should not occur in the context of children‟s 
rights. 
4.3 What is the Added Value of an Optional Protocol? 
4.3.1 Introduction 
The added value of yet another treaty, in the form of an OP, is pertinent in deliberations for 
an OP to the CRC.  Does treaty-ratification improve state behaviour? According to 
Dimitrijevic there are a number of possible limitations of the individual complaints 
procedure, including that states take a reluctant stance against them (this view being 
undermined by their common status);
57
 that human rights are violated by individuals or 
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groups of individuals and not states; and that they can never cover the entire range of 
human rights: 
A modern human rights treaty aims at a generally favourable human rights situation, 
which includes creating the necessary conditions for the enjoyment of human rights 
and the elimination of factors that lead to violations.  If a state is remiss, this very often 
cannot be related to an individual “victim” such as, for instance, when the cost of 
human life becomes low due to disease […] and other circumstances and the right to 
life is thus threatened and violated.
58
 
The latter two arguments appear to misconstrue the nature and purpose of the international 
system of human rights protection. Firstly, they pit the individual against the state (indeed 
this is precisely their post-Second-World-War innovation to international law – this 
“subversive” quality undercutting international law and state sovereignty, so termed by 
Antonio Cassese); here, it is irrelevant whether the violation can be directly attributed to 
the state, or to the failure of the state in protecting individuals from harm.  The very notion 
of human rights arms individuals – as victims and the subjects of international human rights 
as seen in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – with the double-edged sword of the 
persuasive discourse of the language of human rights, and its associated machinery of 
redress. 
 
Empirical studies of the effects of treaty-ratification suggest antithetical views. In the first 
empirical test of the hypothesis that becoming a party to an international human rights 
agreement (specifically, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and its 
Optional Protocol) makes a difference in states‟ actual behaviour, Keith‟s findings suggest 
that overall “perhaps it may be overly optimistic to expect that being a party to this 
international covenant will produce an observable impact. The results are consistent with 
the assertions that the treaty‟s implementation mechanisms are too weak and rely too much 
upon the goodwill of the party state to effect observable change in actual human rights 
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behavior.”59  In her 2002 “large-scale” quantitative analysis of the relationship between 
human rights treaties and countries' human rights practices, Oona Hathaway offers a 
sweeping survey “encompassing the experiences of 166 nations over a nearly forty-year 
period in five areas of human rights law: genocide, torture, fair and public trials, civil 
liberties, and political representation of women”. In her study, Hathaway provides an 
“empirical window” through which she examines two separate but related questions: of 
whether countries comply with the requirements of the human rights treaties they have 
joined and secondly, whether these human rights treaties appear to be effective in 
improving countries' human rights practices.  Hathaway‟s analysis is not so positive; she 
finds that: 
[…] based on the present analysis, ratification of the treaties by individual countries 
appears more likely to offset pressure for change in human rights practices than to 
augment it. The solution to this dilemma is not the abandonment of human rights 
treaties, but a renewed effort to enhance the monitoring and enforcement of treaty 
obligations to reduce opportunities for countries to use ratification as a symbolic 
substitute for real improvements in their citizens' lives.
60
 
So we are not to throw the baby out with the bathwater.   Hathaway‟s study serves to 
demonstrate the need to balance this discrepancy – what she perceives as the tension 
between the three „expressive roles‟ of treaty signature ratification and implementation: 
legal, political, and social, the third being defined as follows:  
Yet treaties also have an expressive function that arises from what membership in a 
treaty regime says about the parties to the treaties. When a country joins a human 
rights treaty, it engages in what might be called „position taking,‟ defined here as the 
public enunciation of a statement on anything likely to be of interest to domestic or 
international actors. In this sense, the ratification of a treaty functions much as a roll-
call vote in the U.S. Congress or a speech in favour of the temperance movement, as a 
pleasing statement not necessarily intended to have any real effect on outcomes. It 
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declares to the world that the principles outlined in the treaty are consistent with the 
ratifying government's commitment to human rights.”61 
The rhetorical, „expressive‟ value of treaty signing and ratification is not one that is 
expressly acknowledged by states in diplomatic deliberations, but one that is likely to play 
a significant role in the later signature and ratification of the drafted OP to the CRC.  If her 
diagnosis is bleak, Hathaway‟s prognosis offers more promise in her insistence that if the 
process is to be successful, the disconnect between the expressive value and the 
instrumental value of treaty-making should be eliminated through giving the monitoring 
bodies more teeth: 
Whatever the outcome of these inquiries, to the extent that noncompliance with many 
human rights treaties is commonplace, the current treaty system may create 
opportunities for countries to use treaty ratification to displace pressure for real change 
in practices. This is a problem that should be addressed. One obvious step toward 
improvement would be to enhance the monitoring of human rights treaty 
commitments, the current weakness of which may make it possible for the expressive 
and instrumental roles of the treaties to work at cross-purposes.
62
 
While quantitative evaluations of the impact of international human rights treaties is a 
contested field,
63
 Beth Simmons has demonstrated that improvements in children‟s rights 
are partly correlated with ratification of the CRC and its protocols after adjusting for other 
possible causes. For example, levels of child labour and numbers of child soldiers and, to a 
lesser extent, unimmunized children fell after ratification, particularly in middle-income 
countries.
64
 She also points to qualitative evidence of the catalytic role of the Convention 
on civil society mobilisation and the development of new legal frameworks.
65
   Further, in 
her quantitative analysis of the effect of the OP to CCPR, Simmons finds that “there is 
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some evidence to suggest that the individual complaints mechanism of the ICCPR is 
associated with modest improvements in civil liberties, controlling for many other possible 
explanations.”66  However, she rightly urges caution: “While we need to be cautious in 
interpreting the evidence, and especially inferring an ironclad causal relationship, the 
possibility that an individual right of standing before a body of experts helps improve rights 
outcomes on average provides a strong rationale for ratification.” Both the proponents and 
opponents of the OP to CEDAW have fallen prey to exaggerating the consequences of the 
treaty:  “It will neither make a serious dent in the statistics cited in the opening paragraph, 
nor will it constitute a „threat to the integrity of the treaty system‟.” The same caution can 
be applied to the deliberations of the OP to the CRC so as not to inflate expectations in any 
direction.   
4.3.2 OP to CEDAW 
For a comparison with a process of elaborating an OP concerning a specific class of people, 
it is useful to turn to the OP to CEDAW.  Similar to the CRC, until the OP came into force, 
the only method to monitor compliance with the treaty was the reporting mechanism.  The 
introduction of the OP was well-received by most legal scholars and women‟s groups67 and 
advocates for an OP to CEDAW argued along similar lines to those advocating for an OP 
to the CRC.  Primarily, it was argued that the adoption of a complaints mechanism would 
help to implement the Convention and the guarantees contained therein: that “an optional 
protocol would strengthen implementation of the Convention by making the rights 
contained in it, where ratified, justiciable, and reflect their status as autonomous and 
fundamental to the advancement of women.”68  Related to this was the argument that “the 
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opportunities given to CEDAW to consider individual cases would permit it to develop a 
more focused and detailed jurisprudence of the Convention, which in turn [would] assist 
states parties and others in more effectively implementing the Convention at the national 
level.”69 Another argument advanced for the OP-CEDAW was that it would facilitate the 
effective adjudication of economic, social and cultural rights, which were still subject to the 
traditional hierarchical downplaying as compared to civil and political rights. Given that 
the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) now has an OP, after a 
strongly contested and deliberated process, it is not surprising that this issue has not been 
raised as a major hurdle to be overcome in the context of the deliberations for an 
complaints procedure to the CRC.
70
    Advocates also pointed out, not insignificantly, that 
“by adopting such an instrument, states would be demonstrating that their rhetorical 
commitments in relation to the protection of women‟s human rights are indeed backed up 
by action.”71  The same would apply to children.  Until now, the lack of an enforcement 
mechanism for the CRC has marginalised the importance of children‟s rights: [k]nowing 
that one has rights at the international level can be empowering, but knowing that one has 
rights that can be enforced at the international level can only be more empowering.”72 
 
4.3.3 Assessing the effectiveness of the OP to CEDAW 
What is the assessment of the effectiveness of the OP to CEDAW?  Most of the criticisms 
seem to stem from the evidence of the continuing violations against women – that the soft 
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enforcement mechanisms of the OP have not prevented violations from occurring.  The 
inadequacies of the optional protocol as a remedy for CEDAW are identified by one critic 
as being the result of the voluntary nature of states‟ willingness to be bound by the treaty 
(that the terms of the OP apply only to states parties to both the CEDAW and the OP); that 
the ratification of the OP is subject to an “opt-out clause”; the limited power of the 
committee (that is can only provide non-binding “views”); and that the OP lacks 
“compelling sanctions and penalties” for violations of the treaty.73  Ultimately, the critique 
hinges on the OP being “soft law” – non-binding, consisting of general norms and 
principles and “not readily enforceable through binding dispute resolution.”  This however, 
can be the criticism hailed against all the UN treaties and enforcement mechanisms.  I 
would submit that such arguments against the adoption of an OP fall prey to the same 
exaggerated understandings or expectations of an OP that inform those of the “over-
judicialization” camp of critics, as noted by Simmons. Effectively, the expectation that the 
Committee functions as a judicial body – fears that it will, or criticism that it falls short – is 
the same premise that informs both extremes.  The Committee is not meant to be a court, 
and the opposition to an OP due to any fears or expectations that it should be so, would be 
mistaken.
74
 
 
The protocol does not substitute the decision of an international court for local 
legislative decision making. External enforcement (since there is none) will not 
undermine these rights‟ stature and acceptability. “Litigation” will not crowd out other 
approaches, since the process of communication outlined in the protocol is not 
designed to supplant local approaches to local economic and social issues, but rather to 
complement them. The idea that the optional protocol represents overlegalization run 
amok is a contorted caricature of the protocol. Once we correctly understand that we 
are not in the world of litigation, but instead in the world of communication and 
persuasion, many of the arguments against ratification of the Optional Protocol lose 
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their bite. The whole debate […] is far less ominous when the purpose is dialogue and 
persuasion rather than “strict violationism”.75 
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5 Call for an Optional Protocol to the CRC facilitating individual 
communications/complaints 
5.1.1 Changing views of children’s rights 
Despite the tendency to naturalise childhood, to treat it as an unchanging essence, 
childhood is socially and historically constructed: how childhood is understood, lived and 
treated has demonstrably changed over different historical periods.  Nowhere is this clearer, 
than in the development of international law concerning children.  Having entered the 
world stage in the 1924 Declaration of the Rights of the Child is the first expression of the 
rights owed to children.  Whilst bringing the child out of the shadows of “historical 
diplomatic invisibility”76 its language is couched in language more appropriate to child 
welfare, than to rights.  In parallel with the developments in international human rights law 
more generally, the post-Second World War formulations of the 1959 Declaration of the 
Rights of the Child
77
 represents a paradigmatic shift in thinking about children‟s rights, as 
“Although the Declaration may be dismissed as representing only „manifesto rights‟, the 
1959 Declaration in comparison to its 1924 predecessor, adopts the language of 
entitlement.”78  As the „conceptual parent‟ of the CRC, the 1959 Declaration paved the way 
for the initial Polish draft in 1978.   
 
Overall, the CRC successfully achieved the creation of new rights for children under 
international law, where previously no rights existed, such as the child‟s right to preserve 
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his or her identity and the codification of accepted practice and the creation of binding 
standards, in areas which were previously non-binding recommendations.
79
  In keeping 
with the framework of international human rights law more generally, children now were 
recognized as rights-holders in their own right, as against the states in which they live.  In 
his 1992 study, Veerman also documented this change of perception
80
 from the “child as 
the object rights in need of protection to the subject of rights whose opinion is voiced and 
asked for.”81 Other positive changes are argued as having taken place, reflecting this 
tectonic paradigm shift in perceptions of children: the shift from a charitable to a political 
conceptual understanding, as well as the nature of the advocacy, being two examples.  In 
relation to the latter, “[w]hereas in the beginning of this century children‟s rights were 
advocated by individuals [...]
82
 their cause became more and more the concern of social and 
political institutions and was at the same time brought to an international (or supranational) 
level.”83  For the purposes of the current inquiry into the OP to the CRC, Veerman‟s 
conclusions related to the negative consequences of this shift are insightful: 
There are also some negative aspects to this shift.  First, such a wide range is beyond a 
child‟s perception.  As long as children were only objects of rights this was no 
problem.  However, now that children are allowed to voice their wishes and 
complaints, the global range has an alienating effect. (A child will not easily be able to 
phone to call the Chairman of the Committee on the Rights of the Child of the United 
Nations.)  Therefore the need was felt for narrowing the scope to an individual level.
84
 
I would submit that this is where Veerman‟s analysis has real bite.  By extending the reach 
of this paradigm shift to the international level, children have been pushed to the outer 
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margins and therefore an attempt to bring them back into the folds – from the peripheries of 
the international system to a more inclusive engagement – becomes necessary. A 
retrenchment of this effect of the international system (of protection) is needed in order to 
reduce the marginalisation of children in the bigger picture.  Two decades on from this 
analysis, a complaints procedure precisely would seem to be in order. 
5.1.2 An Optional Protocol on the Horizon 
Perhaps unsurprisingly then, there is now a strong and growing international campaign for 
the drafting and adoption of an OP to the CRC to provide a communications/complaints 
procedure.  The machinery was set into motion by NGOs, human rights institutions and 
other international bodies.  This NGO working group appears to have been the main 
campaigner for an OP to the CRC allowing for individual complaints, with over 635 
international and national organizations having signed the associated petition: “An 
international call to strengthen the enforcement of the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child by the drafting of an Optional Protocol to provide a communications procedure”. The 
culmination of the above campaigning resulted in the adoption on 17 June 2009 by the UN 
Human Rights Council of a Resolution establishing an Open-ended Working Group with a 
mandate to “explore the possibility of elaborating an optional protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child to provide a communications procedure complementary to the 
reporting procedure under the Convention”. The „Open-ended‟ nature of the Working 
Group ensures that all UN Member and Observer States, intergovernmental organizations 
with ECOSOC consultative status may attend and participate in the public meetings of the 
Working Group. 
 
The Working Group met for the first in December 2009 and States, experts and civil 
society had the opportunity to discuss the different issues raised by the creation of this new 
instrument. On the 18
th
 of March 2010, only a few months later, the Human Rights Council 
has adopted by consensus a new resolution (Appendix 1) that gives the Working Group the 
mandate to draft an Optional Protocol.
85
 
                                                 
85 UN Doc. A/HRC/13/L.5 18 March 2010.  
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5.2 First Session of the Open-ended Working Group for the Communications 
Procedure 
5.2.1 Introduction 
The Working Group held its first session in Geneva from the 14-18 December 2009, 
whereby it was hoped, that by the end of the session, the Working Group would agree that 
there is a need to begin drafting this new procedure.  A stronger mandate would thus be 
sought through a Resolution in the Human Rights Council at its March session in 2010.  It 
would seem that this specific aim was not met, with the Chairperson of the Working Group, 
Mr. Štefánek (who had initially planned to propose a recommendation to this effect in his 
report) having „changed his mind and decided to leave this decision to the Human Rights 
Council at its March session.‟86  However, there was a positive reception, indeed „strong 
and unanimous support‟ for the need for moving on to  the elaboration of the necessary OP, 
as evidenced by the fact that „many States indicated their commitment to this goal,‟ with no 
state having voiced opposition to the proposal.
87
  This is supported by the statement of the 
representative of the International Commission of Jurists, who stated that „it seems clear 
that most participants concur that the establishment of a communications procedure is both 
necessary and practicable.‟88 
 
Overall, five pertinent issues regarding the need for, scope and procedural characteristics of 
such a OP were considered over the 16-7 December period of the session, namely: (i) 
Reasons and timing, (ii) Existing mechanisms, (iii) Efficiency in protection, (iv) Unique 
rights, and (v) Implications of a procedure.  The Chair of the CRC Committee provided the 
framework for discussion, in her opening address for the first discussion topic: that the 
                                                 
86 'Meeting of the Un Working Group for the Communications Procedure, December 2009', (CRIN, 2010) at 
18. 
87 Ibid.  
88 Ibid. at 18-9.  
 34 
CRC Committee had extensively discussed such an OP, and considered it feasible and very 
necessary.   
5.2.2 Reasons and timing 
The CRC General Comment 12, on the right to be heard, was seen to pave the way for the 
OP in this topic of discussion.  Again, the general mood of states was positive, with many 
states reiterating a number of common grounds of support: that children had waited long 
enough for their rights to be realized; that children‟s rights are unique rights that therefore 
require a unique procedure; that children‟s rights must be protected at the national, regional 
and international levels; and that such an OP will facilitate a stronger normative 
international framework.
89
  Even states that did not enunciate the need for an OP were 
generally open and willing to be convinced, with (fewer) more guarded responses, such as 
that of South Korea, whose representative queried whether having a domestic system 
would be a good alternative to a complaints mechanism system.
90
 That the CRC is now the 
only monitored treaty without a complaints mechanism, therefore subject to discrimination, 
may be seen as mere symbolism.  However, the argument that the singling out of the CRC 
is discriminatory goes beyond being a mere tokenistic gesture to being a very strong 
argument that „can really only be challenged by challenging the very concept of children as 
rights-holders.‟91  Strong arguments would have to be advanced as to why children are not 
rights-holders – a discussion which has not been entered into at the Working Group 
meeting or in the literature to date. 
5.2.3 Existing mechanisms 
Judging by the report of the proceedings the dialogue of what can be learned from other 
international mechanisms, pivoted around the concern for the duplication of existing 
                                                 
89 See for example, the statements of representatives from the Maldives, Slovenia, Portugal, and 
Switzerland.  
90 'Meeting of the Un Working Group for the Communications Procedure, December 2009', at 6. 
91 Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, 'Reasons and Timing to Elaborate a Communications Procedure under the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child' (10 December 2009) UN Doc. A/HRC/WG.7/1/CRP.4, at 4.  
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mechanisms.  The UN Special Rapporteur for sexual exploitation, child prostitution and 
child pornography, who introduced this topic, led the discussion through a positive 
emphasis on the complementarity between the roles of the various treaty bodies, 
particularly with reference to children.  On the whole, the conclusions seemed to rest on the 
inevitability of duplication, but that this was a positive factor, rather than one to be viewed 
negatively.  Forum shopping would be discouraged, it was suggested, where there was 
consistency and overlap between the treaty bodies.  Interestingly, the issue as to the actual 
number of complaints having been received, to date, by or on behalf of children, was raised 
by China, but not developed.  The representative asked: “How many complaints have they 
received to date? We believe the number has been low, so we need to know why this has 
been the case.”92 It would seem that the answers to these questions would go a long way 
towards understanding the specific case of children as complainants, and the extent to 
which the current system is able to effectively offer remedies to children alleging violations 
of their human rights.  I attempt to answer these questions, in the later section of my 
analysis, in order to shed some light on the issue as to the need for a complaints mechanism 
to the CRC.  
 
5.2.4 Efficiency in protection 
The gap between standard-setting instruments and practice is one which is often bemoaned.  
Needless to say, the disparity between ratification of the CRC (which is near universal save 
for the United States of America and Somalia) and implementation reflects and reinforces 
this all too-commonly expressed observation.   This is an underlying theme structuring this 
topic of discussion of the Working Group.  Mr. Newell, one of the experts who presented at 
the Working Group meeting stressed the interconnectedness of international, regional and 
national mechanisms – that they are not mutually exclusive – that strengthening the CRC 
would translate into improved national/domestic implementation; this would be the only 
way to prevent the adverse progress and persisting violations from going hand in hand.  A 
major concern expressed here, by Canada for example, was the collective complaints 
                                                 
92 'Meeting of the Un Working Group for the Communications Procedure, December 2009', at 7. 
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procedure.  Having raised the issue, it was then addressed in turn by Mr. Newell who 
reminded state representatives that both individuals and groups of victims were provided 
for as complainants in the OPs to the CESCR and CEDAW.  Further, Newell attempted to 
reassure states that the collective complaints procedure would be one way of developing a 
procedure which could constructively influence national laws and policies: “surely we have 
to accept and welcome a dual aim of communications – to achieve individual remedies 
where violations have occurred as speedily as possible, but also prevent further, similar 
violations from occurring.”93   However, states‟ concluding level of agreement or 
otherwise, on the issue of collective complaints is not clear from the report of the text. 
 
5.2.5 Unique nature of rights 
Many of the rights safeguarded by the CRC are not covered by other provisions in the 
various core international human rights treaties. The following (non-exhaustive list) 
provides some examples of the CRC‟s improvements over other treaties: 
1. Best interests of the child (Article 3);   
2. Preservation of identity (Article 8); 
3. Right to express opinions (Article 12) which is “a unique provision in a human 
rights treaty, which addresses the legal and social status of children, who, on the one hand 
lack the full autonomy of adults but, on the other, are subjects of rights”;   
4. Prevention of abuse by those responsible for care (Article 19) which is significant 
as it implicitly extends responsibility to private individuals, thereby destabilising the 
„traditional‟ public private divide,  emphasises prevention of intra-familial abuse and 
neglect „which has never previously figured in a binding instrument;‟  
5. Adoption (Article 21) which codifies principles that were adopted three years 
earlier by the UN in the framework of a non-binding declaration.   
6. Health and access to care (Article 24) where for the first time State‟s are under an 
obligation to work towards abolishing harmful traditional practices and references are made 
to the advantages of breastfeeding; 
                                                 
93 Ibid. at 10. 
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7. Rights of child cared for outside the family to periodic review of care (Article 25);  
8. Obligation to recover maintenance from those having financial responsibility for the 
child (Article 27); 
9. Education and school discipline to be consistent with child‟s human dignity (Article 
28); 
10. Education to meet detailed aims (Article 29); 
11. Right to rest, leisure and play (Article 31); and 
12. Specific protection from sexual exploitation and abuse, including child pornography 
(Article 34). 
 
As suggested by the Vice Chair of the CRC, one can go as far as to state that „nearly all the 
rights under the CRC are specific rights.  It is much easier to mention the rights that are not 
specific to children; they are the thematic rights such as non discrimintation [sic] and so on, 
which apply to all treaties.‟94  Even where the rights that the CRC spells out are not 
exclusive rights, the CRC spells them out uniquely.  It could be argued that even where the 
rights are covered elsewhere, the child-focused nature of the rights constituted therein 
makes the CRC uniquely suited to promote and protect the rights of children specifically. 
By way of an example, the right to education is enshrined in a range of international 
conventions, including the ICESCR, CEDAW as well as the CRC, and various regional 
treaties. In articulating the right, the CRC provides more detail by requiring that “States 
Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that school discipline is administered 
in a manner consistent with the child's human dignity” (Article 28) and sets out some of the 
broader aims of education for children in Article 29.  In its General Comment 1 on the 
Aims of Education,
 95
 the CRC Committee stressed the importance of these aims as being 
“linked directly to the realization of the child's human dignity and rights, taking into 
account the child's special developmental needs and diverse evolving capacities.” 
 
                                                 
94 Ibid. at 11. 
95
 CRC, ‘General Comment 1: The Aims of Education – Article 29 (1)’ (2001) UN Doc. CRC/GC/2001/1. 
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The CRC is broad in scope, covering both economic, social and cultural rights and civil and 
political rights, without the now redundant distinction between them.  The theme discussed 
by the Working Group under this head of discussion was whether children and their 
representatives need a procedure that enables them to pursue remedies for breaches of their 
full range of rights, when national remedies are non-existent or ineffective.  The report of 
the proceedings is the most detailed here, with state representatives having raised a number 
of related concerns.  Argentina opened by raising the issue of capacity, and that it is to the 
Disabilities Convention (CRPD) to which we must turn for guidance as to how this can and 
has been accommodated.  South Korea again demonstrated a mutually exclusive approach 
by expressing the desire to see better national implementation – through institutions such as 
ombudsmen – and that contentment with the status quo through stating that the CRC 
Committee‟s General Comments could be more influential in this regard.  The issue of 
manipulation of children was also raised here – how to ensure the child was not 
manipulated through a complaints procedure.  Surely this is not new to this OP as children 
have not been barred from submitting complaints before the other treaty bodies, on these 
grounds. As a child-specific instrument – drafted (and implemented) specifically with 
children in mind – the CRC would seem ideally placed to deal with these issues. 
5.2.6 Right to a Remedy 
The issue of remedies, though not raised as an independent topic for discussion, arose in 
the context of unique rights, detailed above.  Ms. Pais, the UN Special Representative on 
Violence Against Children raised this primary issue, that: “The Convention says we must 
have a remedy and it doesn‟t do it explicitly so we need an OP.”96 This is a critical 
question, and one that was raised independently by a CRC Committee member back in 
2002 in addressing the various ways of strengthening complaint procedures:  
 
                                                 
96
 'Complaints Mechanism: Unique Rights', 
<http://www.crin.org/resources/infoDetail.asp?ID=21458&flag=news>, accessed 14 May 2010. See also 
“Human Rights Council Working Group on an optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
to provide a communications procedure: Marta Santos Pais, Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
on Violence against Children” (14 December 2009) UN Doc. A/HRC/WG.7/1/CRP. 
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I [would] like to note that the CRC does not contain any specific provision regarding 
the possible actions by or on behalf of the child in case of a violation of her/his rights.  
But other treaties do: Article 2(3) ICCPR stating that States Parties undertake to 
“ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms (recognized in the ICCPR) are 
violated shall have an effective remedy.”97 
Many delegates pointed to the inherent right of children to a remedy for violations of 
rights. Slovakia, who holds the chairmanship of the Working Group, stated “that there was 
no doubt that children were full rights holders and should have every chance to have their 
rights respected.”98 The Chair then continued that “having the CRC Committee investigate 
complaints is the only way to go to ensure all their rights are fulfilled” although 
acknowledging that is was only one extra tool to increase „effective implementation‟.  
 
This argument for the primacy of remedies has been central to human rights thought and 
the right to a remedy is contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights itself in 
Article 29. As Dinah Shelton has noted, the terms „remedies‟ and „redress‟ refer to both 
“the substance of relief as well as the procedures through which relief may be obtained.”99 
Both of these elements are relevant to an OP to the CRC which is said to provide the 
procedural mechanism for child victims of human rights violations and substantive redress 
or damages for violations of specifically child-related rights. This distinction is made clear 
in the HRC Resolution 10/14 where reference is made to „child-sensitive procedures‟ as a 
means of facilitating effective remedies.   
 
                                                 
97 Jaap E. Doek, 'Ways to Strengthen the Complaints Procedures, Particularly the Individual Complaint', 
Stopping the Economic Exploitation of Children: New Approaches to Fighting Poverty as a Means of 
Implementing Human Rights? (Hattingen, Germany, 2002) at 6. 
98 'Complaints Mechanism: Discussions Begin at the Un', 
<http://www.crin.org/resources/infodetail.asp?id=21436>, accessed 14 May 2010. 
99 Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 8-
9.  
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The right to redress or remedies is not explicitly mentioned in the CRC but the Committee 
in its General Comment No. 5 has viewed them as essential to the effective implementation 
of the CRC: 
For rights to have meaning, effective remedies must be available to redress violations.  
This requirement is implicit in the Convention and consistently referred to in the other 
six major international human rights treaties. Children‟s special and dependent status 
creates real difficulties for them in pursuing remedies for breaches of their rights.  So 
States need to give particular attention to ensuring that there are effective, child-
sensitive procedures available to children and their representatives.  These should 
include the provision of child-friendly information, advice, advocacy, including 
support for self-advocacy, and access to independent complaints procedures and to the 
courts with necessary legal and other assistance.  Where rights are found to have been 
breached, there should be appropriate reparation, including compensation, and, where 
needed, measures to promote physical and psychological recovery, rehabilitation and 
reintegration, as required by article 39.
100
 
This perspective was recently endorsed by states at the Human Rights Council in March 2009, where 
all states were called upon:  
to ensure that child-sensitive procedures are made available to children and their 
representatives so that children have access to means of facilitating effective remedies 
for any breaches of any of their rights arising from the Convention through 
independent advice, advocacy and complaint procedures, including justice 
mechanisms, and that their views are heard when they are involved or their interests 
concerned in justice procedures […].101  
Given this strong state affirmation of the right of children to a remedy, it is perhaps not 
surprising that no delegates in the Working Group disagreed with this basic position that 
remedies were necessary for the fulfilment of rights. Likewise, none of the more general 
arguments against judicial or administrative review at the national or international level 
were noted:
102
 that it was an intrusion on democratic or sovereign space; that legalisation of 
                                                 
100 UN CRC General Comment No. 5: General Measure of Implementation of the Convention on the rights of 
the Child (2003) at 7. 
101 HRC Resolution 10/14,’ Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional 
Protocols Thereto’ (26 March 2009), at [11]. 
102 See analysis of the discussions on this topic in the OP-ICESCR Working Group in the context of the 
broader literature in Malcolm Langford, 'Closing the Gap? An Introduction to the Optional Protocol to the 
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rights distracted from effective collective solutions or that other forms of international 
dispute resolution could obviate the need for such a procedure.
103
  
 
Moreover, there were no states who ventured the argument that they themselves were 
perfectly capable of fashioning domestic remedies for the problem and that the focus 
should be on strengthening national systems. The representative of South Korea, who 
supports the process, did ask the question “whether having a domestic system would not be 
a good alternative to a CRC complaints mechanism.”104 The answers provided by other 
states emphasized “that there are often no effective national systems for safeguarding 
children's rights” and that “one of the main ways to improve national remedies is to bring 
in the OP”.105 According to this line of reasoning, the requirement of domestic remedies 
under the OP will force states to improve national complaint systems to avoid international 
complaints or that the protocol may inspire national actors to further improve domestic 
remedies. This argument was also successfully put forward in arguing for ratification of OP 
to CEDAW where the complaints procedure “stimulates the development and improvement 
of internal remedy systems which cannot be neglected by international supervisory bodes 
and – what is more important – will have a corrective and preventive effect against other 
human rights violations.”106 
 
Lastly, there was little discussion over whether all or only some of the rights in the CRC 
were deserving of a remedy. In particular, no states objected to economic, social and 
                                                                                                                                                    
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', Nordic Journal of Human Rights, 27/1 
(2009), 1-28 at 1. 
103 See Section 4.2 above.  However, the sentiment was clear at the Working Group that additional tools 
were potentially needed beyond that of the Special Rapporteur mandates. 
104 'Complaints Mechanism: Timing and Feasibility Discussion', 
<http://www.crin.org/resources/infoDetail.asp?ID=21444&flag=news>, accessed 14 May 2010.   
105 Ibid.  
106 Gilchrist, 'The Optional Protocol to the Women's Convention: An Argument for Ratification',  at 780. 
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cultural (ESC) rights being subjected to the proposed international complaints procedure. 
One of the likely reasons for this is that the issue was substantially addressed during the 
drafting of the OP-ICESCR. The Chairperson of the Committee of the Rights of the Child 
indicated that in discussions in 1999, the justiciability of ESC rights was identified as a 
potential barrier to the development of a protocol.
107
 Ten years later, delegates at the 
Working Group expressly stated that it no longer posed such a problem. The adoption by 
consensus of the OP-ICESCR in the General Assembly in December 2008 had resolved the 
question. 
5.2.7 Implications of a procedure 
The concerns raised here, by state representatives, revolved around the fear of overload of 
work for the CRC Committee, and the potential to jeopardize the reporting procedures of 
the CRC.  The Chair of the CRC Committee tried to allay these fears thorough her 
reassurances that the CRC Committee‟s role would in no way be compromised by the 
addition of a communications procedure.
108
  It is in this context that Italy raised another 
critical procedural issue (I turn to this issue in Chapter 7) as to timing of and time-limits for 
complaints: namely, what happens in the event that the violation complained of occurred in 
childhood, but is presented as a complaint when the complainant is older 18 years of age? 
The report does not detail a response by any Committee members to this question.  
  
                                                 
107
 'Complaints Mechanism: Timing and Feasibility Discussion',  Ms Lee is also quoted as indicating that the 
international community was more interested in the definition of child rights at this time rather than 
procedural matters: see UN HRC, ‘Report of the Open-Ended Working Group to Explore the Possibility of 
Elaborating an Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child to Provide a Communications 
Procedure’, (21 January 2010) UN Doc. A/HRC/13/43, at [26]. 
108
 Yanghee Lee, “Reasons and timing for a communications procedure under the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child” (14 December 2009) UN Doc. A/HRC/WG.7/1/CRP.6. 
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6 Current instruments and low usage 
As individuals, children can seek redress for any alleged breaches, through individual 
complaint mechanisms under the aforementioned
109
 conventions.  I searched all of the 
cases brought to the HRC, CEDAW Committee and CERD Committee, where children 
were applicants directly, or where cases were brought on behalf of children.
110
  Upon 
examination, I found there to be too few cases, which fulfilled these criteria: approximately 
40 cases before the HRC and one under CEDAW and CERD respectively (see Figure 1, 
below).  The cases brought before the HRC are clustered under particularly identifiable 
themes, namely: disappearances, custody cases, deportation (under the heads of 
interference with family and failure to protect minors), religious education, death row, and 
imprisonment.  In my survey I included cases where children were not parties but affected 
by the decision.  This can be exemplified by a case brought by parents regarding their right 
to educate their children according to their religious beliefs, where the children were not 
parties (except indirectly) and it was the right of the parent that was being argued, not that 
of the child's right to education.
111
  Similar cases where children were indirectly affected 
were the minority rights cases, where the decision of the HRC has an effect on children as 
members of indigenous groups specifically. 
 
The one case brought before the CERD Committee involving a child was one of racial 
discrimination brought by a father on behalf of his son (who was aged 15 at time of 
events).  The case was ruled inadmissible by Committee on two grounds: firstly, on the 
ground that there were no heads of dispute or provisions identified by the author for 
complaint, and secondly, that the complaint regarding the author‟s son was seen to fall 
outside the scope of the Convention (namely that the author requested a criminal retrial.
112
  
                                                 
109 See note 4 above. 
110
 Including children up to and including the age of 18. 
111 See Waldman v. Canada (1999) and Tadman et al v. Canada (1999). 
112 P. and his son M.P. v. Denmark (1995) CERD Communication No. 5/1994.  
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Figure 1: Children's participation in decided cases since the adoption of an optional protocol to various treaties. 
 
The case brought before the CEDAW Committee is a procedurally interesting case where a 
six-year-old girl was one of the authors of the complaint, the others being two of her older 
adult siblings.
113
  Two NGOs submitted the complaint on behalf of the authors. Here, 
though a minor was the complainant, the case was brought on behalf of the deceased 
victim, the mother of the applicant,
114
 and not on the child‟s on behalf. As this is the only 
                                                 
113
 The victim had had three children from her first marriage, two of whom are adults. Her youngest 
daughter, Melissa, was born on 30 July 1998.  Signed consent forms from two adult children and one minor 
represented by her father were received. 
114 Fatma Yildirim (Deceased) v. Austria (2007) CEDAW Communication No. 6/2005. 
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case brought by a child applicant to the CEDAW Committee, it could support one author‟s 
claim that CEDAW is not effective at protecting the rights of girl children.
115
  
 
Upon an examination of the cases brought before the Human Rights Committee 
(monitoring body for the CCPR), two observations are discernable, among others.  The first 
is related to the child‟s applicant status.  Often the application is made by an adult, often an 
interested party herself, on the child‟s behalf, rather than the child submitting his or her 
own Communication. “[I]t seems likely that, to date, most if not all of the cases in which 
children are named as applicants have in fact been initiated and pursued by adults and the 
named children have had very little, or no, involvement in the procedure.”116  This seems 
particularly true for complaints made to the Human Rights Committee. 
 
Secondly, it becomes apparent upon perusal of the cases, that there is no gender-specific 
approach by the Human Rights Committee to the cases brought before it.  Some cases do 
involve girls, but that is not an issue that is isolated as being particularly decisive.  No 
doubt, this is a reflection of the wording of the International Bill of Rights itself, where no 
reference is made to the girl child in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (hereinafter CESCR) and the CCPR.   This can be seen to reflect a gender-
neutral approach to children‟s rights in international human rights law generally and in the 
CRC specifically.   As highlighted by one commentator, the gender-neutrality of the CRC 
operates to further marginalise and silence the voices of specific children, here girls, in 
international human rights discourse: “Despite almost universal ratification, the efficacy of 
the Convention is diminished by its failure to account for the intersecting identity of girls.  
It‟s luke-warm provisions for the rights of girl-children and the omission of girl-specific 
                                                 
115
 See Taefi, 'The Synthesis of Age and Gender: Intersectionality, International Human Rights Law and the 
Marginalisation of the Girl-Child',  (at 52. Incidentally the word “girl” does not feature at all in the 
terminology of the CEDAW Convention. 
116 Peter Newell, 'Children’s Use of International and Regional Human Rights Complaint/Communications 
Mechanisms: Background Paper', International Justice for Children (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2007), 17. 
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issues have instituted a lacuna in the body of international human rights law.”117 This is 
reminiscent of the arguments in favour of an OP to CEDAW, that the androgynous nature 
of the International Bill of Rights – Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) and 
its two Covenants – rendered women invisible international human rights protection 
framework. The CRC is seen to reflect the same gender-neutrality.  Thus, although hailed 
as feminist landmark,
118
 the CRC “appears to have fallen short of its potential. The 
linguistic factors that once seemed crucial are now exposed tokenistic”119 which suggests 
that assertion that apparent ambiguities in the CRC further serve to make girls vulnerable to 
ongoing discrimination in the existing frameworks of the international system of 
protection. Consequently, the question as to the need for an OP is rendered even more 
relevant given the capacity of a semi-judicial supervisory body to demarcate the boundaries 
of a given legal instrument through the opportunity afforded by individual complaints 
mechanisms. An individual complaints mechanism has the added benefit that 
“[c]onsideration of individual cases provides the supervisory body with an opportunity to 
interpret human rights guarantees in a manner which general discussions and exegeses do 
not provide.”120 One would envisage that in the event of such an OP, the CRC Committee 
would offer more gender-specific analyses of cases brought before it by girls who are the 
victims of gender-specific abuses of their human rights.  
 
Returning to the Human Rights Committee and its assessment of child-related cases – 
brought on behalf of or by children: how does one account for the low usage of the system 
by children?  Does it reflect merely a procedural problem of access to justice, or is it 
                                                 
117 Taefi, 'The Synthesis of Age and Gender: Intersectionality, International Human Rights Law and the 
Marginalisation of the Girl-Child', at 356. 
118
 Cynthia Price Cohen, 'The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Feminist Landmark', in 
Michael Freeman (ed.), Children's Rights (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 2004). 
119 Taefi, 'The Synthesis of Age and Gender: Intersectionality, International Human Rights Law and the 
Marginalisation of the Girl-Child', at 357. 
120 Byrnes and Connors, 'Enforcing the Rights of Women: A Complaints Procedure for the Women’s 
Convention', at 703. 
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indicative of the lack of protection afforded by the substantive provisions contained in 
CCPR?  By way of an overarching answer to these questions, perhaps this is a reflection of 
the adult-oriented nature and focus of the instruments in question; that, as it is “For some 
external critics, the discourse of human rights is not just [adult]-dominated and –deployed: 
it is [adult].”121  Here the language of human rights discourse is seen to render children 
invisible through its general age-neutrality.  In response to the last question, it is not 
difficult to argue that the absence of specific provisions in the CCPR that deal with child-
related concerns may account for its poor use by children.  Four of the fifty-three articles of 
the CCPR explicitly refer to children; article 24 is specifically designed for children and 
states that every child “shall have, without any discrimination […] the right to such 
measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, 
society and the State,” “shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name,” 
and “has the right to acquire a nationality.”  Article 23 details what is to happen to children 
in divorce and separation proceedings,
122
 and perhaps accounts for why a significant 
proportion of the cases I examined were custody-related.  Article 18 establishes the 
parents‟ right to “the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with 
their own convictions.”  Article 14 is a general provision “aimed at ensuring the proper 
administration of justice, and to this end upholds a series of individual rights such as 
equality before the courts and tribunals and the right to a fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”123 Children are carved 
out in this provision only pertaining to the making public of court judgments.  
                                                 
121 Engle, 'International Human Rights and Feminism: When Discourses Meet', at 591.; I have replaced the 
word ‘male’ with ‘adult’ for emphasis. 
122 Art. 23(4) reads “States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of 
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123 HRC, ‘General Comment 13: Article 14’ (1984) UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 14. Article 14 reads: “ All 
persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against 
him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by 
a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The press and the public may be 
excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or national security in a 
democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent 
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Another reason that could be advanced as to why other mechanisms are not used by  
Children is that the problem is primarily that of „access to justice‟, where it can be argued 
that the substantive redress (damages) may be available from the Human Rights 
Committee, for example, but that there is a barrier to the access to justice for children. 
Accordingly to this line of reasoning, the substantive provisions are available for use by 
children.  However, as can seen from the provisions referring to children in the CCPR, if 
only four out over fifty address children specifically, this may provide one strong reason 
for its minimal usage. In short, it may evince that children‟s experiences of their rights 
violations are not being reflected. Of course, it may also be that the damages are 
unsatisfactory and therefore inhibit the use of the complaints mechanism to the CCPR; and 
that if the potential outcome does not seem helpful, the victim will not bring the case.  But, 
this does not seem to be at issue here. 
 
Notwithstanding the few provisions in the CCPR specifically addressing children, perhaps 
the Human Rights Committee is well-placed to adjudicate children‟s complaints through its 
standards upon which it evaluates a claimed human rights abuse. The question as to 
whether the Committee has effectively used a subjective approach (at least partially) is a 
useful standard by which to test assess this claim.  A subjective approach can be 
exemplified by the Vuolanne v. Finland on the issue of torture, by what the HRC entitles 
the contextual appraisal (paragraph 9.1) which although an objective analysis, considers the 
"circumstances of the case, such as the duration and manner of the treatment, its physical or 
mental effects as well as the sex, age and state of health of the victim." Similarly, in C. v. 
Australia, the HRC seemed to determine a violation based on the subjective experience of 
the complainant, who although treated similarly to all other immigrant detainees, 
subjectively experienced mental suffering as a result of his detention. While not child 
                                                                                                                                                    
strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the 
interests of justice; but any judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law shall be made public 
except where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial 
disputes or the guardianship of children.” 
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cases, this type of research inquiry could shed some light on any differences between an 
OP to the CRC and other committees, such as the HRC and CEDAW Committee that could 
also protect children rights (as individuals). It would seem from these types of cases that 
the HRC is capable of dealing with child cases in determining violations on 'child terms' – 
the child‟s subjective experience in the case as opposed to an 'averaged' individual standard 
covering all ages of individuals.  This would be a way through which to off-set the very 
few articles that address children specifically.   
 
However, given the few cases brought before the HRC by children, this confidence is 
somewhat qualified.  Even when brought by or on behalf of children, the HRC can be seen 
to have been quite limited in its subjective analysis of children.  Turning to a highly 
publicised case which was decided favourably for the applicants (including five children) 
Bakhtiyari v. Australia, it is insightful to assess the way the HRC dealt with the state 
party‟s submissions concerning the use of the CRC.  The issue turned on article 24, 
specifically designed for children.  Australia rejected that this provision should be 
interpreted in a similar way to the CRC, quoting the HRC having “noted that it is not 
competent to examine allegations of violations of other instruments, and should thus 
restrict its consideration to Covenant obligations.”  The tirade against the interpretation of 
this child-specific provision with reference to the CRC thus continued, that: 
[i]t is clear, in any event, that article 24, paragraph 1, is different in nature to CRC 
rights and obligations, being, as described by Nowak, a comprehensive duty to 
guarantee that all children within a State party's jurisdiction are protected, 14 whether 
through support for the family, through support for corresponding private facilities for 
children, or other measures. The obligation is not complete, extending only to such 
protective measures as required by the child's status as a minor.
124
 
In its Views, the HRC did not refer to the CRC explicitly; however, in finding that “the 
principle that in all decisions affecting a child, its best interests shall be a primary 
consideration, forms an integral part of every child's right to such measures of protection as 
required by his or her status as a minor, on the part of his or her family, society and the 
                                                 
124 Bakhtiyari v. Australia (2003) Communication No 1069/2002 at [5.15]. 
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State, as required by article 24, paragraph 1, of the Covenant,”125 it brought one of the four 
guiding principles of the CRC into the ballpark of its reasoning.  I would submit that this 
case demonstrates the modest victory that is offered by the analysis of children‟s claims 
before an international human rights treaty body, here the most successful one, the HRC.  
The case clearly demonstrates that even where there is a win for the children, the 
Committee makes it clear (through its omission of references to the CRC) that it is deciding 
independently of this important Convention: even despite the reasoning being clearly 
influenced by the latter.  This would seem to strengthen the need for a child-specific forum 
to which children can submit complaints.  Not only would their cases be given a more 
honest appraisal according to the standards embodied in the CRC, but the substantive 
grounds upon which they could rely would exponentially increase.  Thus, guided by the 
principles inherent in the CRC and armed with the necessary tools, the CRC Committee 
would be perfectly placed to adjudicate the claims of individual children and thereby 
further develop the parameters of the rights contained therein. 
  
                                                 
125 Ibid at [9.7]. 
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7 Drafting Issues: Weaving the Fabric of Accountability 
7.1 Introduction 
As can be seen by earlier deliberations for OPs, to CEDAW or to the CESCR for example, 
the same recurring issues arise regarding the need for and usefulness of the instrument in 
question – what it adds to the existing framework of protection.  What can perhaps be lost 
sight of in any discussion about new international mechanisms or procedures for 
strengthening, monitoring or protecting human rights, and the related evaluation of existing 
processes and procedures, is the underlying purpose of the instrument in question.  In the 
drafting of an OP to the CRC, one must recall the purpose of the CRC is to make states 
accountable for the way in which they ensure children have their rights respected and 
protected.  This can be deduced from the “presumption that States parties, in establishing a 
monitoring mechanism, intended to establish an effective means for achieving 
accountability in relation to the obligations contained in the Convention” (emphasis 
added).
126
  Ultimately, what must be remembered is that this is yet another step in the 
ongoing process of making states accountable for their treatment of the children in their 
territory; that: 
it is therefore no longer acceptable to ask simply whether the procedures laid down are 
capable of achieving that goal and, if they are not self-evidently adequate, proceeding 
to accept large gaps in the fabric of accountability.  Instead, the relevant Committee is 
called upon to develop the threads (and doctrines) which are necessary to weave a 
whole cloth of State accountability.
127
 
                                                 
126 Philip Alston, 'Establishing Accountability: Some Current Challenges in Relation to Human Rights 
Monitoring', in Eugeen Verhellen (ed.), Monitoring Children's Rights (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1996), 21-32 at 30. 
127 Ibid. at 30-1. 
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A deliberated process will build consensus and increase the chances for widespread 
ratification. On this point we can only look to the CRC itself. The drafting of the CRC took 
place over a period of ten years, upon the establishment of an „open-ended‟ working group 
established for that purpose by the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1979.  As 
highlighted by one particular commentator, and noted by the Secretary-General at the time, 
there was a “spirit of great co-operation not only amongst the non-governmental 
organizations but also among states” during the drafting stages of the CRC, to the extent 
that “a great number of state representatives became more involved with the subject of the 
treaty than is the norm.”128 Most poignantly, the lowest common denominator approach of 
adopting each provision by consensus can perhaps be one reason that accounts for the 
CRC‟s unprecedented ratification rate by States.  
 
At the same time, it is worthwhile keeping in mind the reflection of Philip Alston as to the 
suitability of an international diplomatic forum being able to „resolve‟ all relevant issues in 
the drafting of international instruments. Advisor during the drafting of the CRC itself, he 
states in this vein that “the inevitably superficial nature of the diplomatic negotiations that 
took place at the international level in order to produce a compromise document such as the 
Convention [CRC] are not all at conducive to a detailed or nuanced understanding of many 
of the key issues that arise.”129   
7.2 Who is the Victim? 
The concept of the „victim‟ is a technical one.  Under the jurisprudence of the HRC, it has 
been clearly established that in order to satisfy the victim test the alleged violations of 
rights must relate to specific individuals at a specific time.  “A victim is not 
hypothetical,”130 and the individuals must be actually and personally affected by a law or 
practice which arguably violates their rights. 
                                                 
128 Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child at 388. 
129 Philip Alston, Children, Rights, and the Law (London: Clarendon, 1992) at vi-vii. 
130 Emilia Della Torre, 'Women's Business: The Development of an Optional Protocol to the United Nations 
Women's Convention', Australian Journal of Human Rights (6, 2000), 181. 
 53 
 
The new optional protocol needs to be drafted with careful consideration of the special 
status of children and the temporality of childhood.  Who is the subject of the OP is a 
question that brings to the fore the underlying assumptions of one‟s understanding of 
children‟s rights more generally and the CRC itself.  Is the Convention seen to be an 
expression of the rights of individuals, whilst they are under the age of eighteen? Or does it 
accord particular significance to the abuse of the rights of children?  In other words, is it 
merely a tool providing a forum to voice human rights concerns to those younger than 
eighteen, or is its focus on the collective form of “the child”? If the latter, than the CRC is 
afforded more symbolic weight by asserting that the violation of a child's rights is of a 
different class – and possibly even a graver class of human rights violation.  If the CRC is 
seen only as the former, as a means of redress for individuals (with certain age limitations) 
then its significance is somewhat undermined.  I would posit that this question is not 
merely relevant in the corridors of theory, but has implications for the definition and scope 
of the victim for a complaints mechanism.    Assuming the existence of the OP to the CRC, 
if one adopts the former understanding of the CRC, than its use would expire at an 
individual‟s rite of passage into the world of post-18 adulthood, where he or she than has 
recourse to the other available mechanisms.  According to this line of reasoning, any 
violation that may have occurred during childhood must now be addressed by another 
treaty body and Committee.  This would be the rational consequence of O‟Neil‟s theory or 
aptly described “counsel of despair” for children, where the only remedy for their 
powerless state is to “grow up.”131 However, I would submit that this view undermines the 
significance of violations of children’s rights, and prefers to deal with them merely as 
violations of human rights as experienced by children.  Accordingly, once having matured 
into adulthood, a child could no longer seek redress through the CRC and its potential 
complaints mechanism.  This would pose a significant shortcoming to the CRC‟s protection 
of children‟s rights.  
 
                                                 
131
 Fortin, Children's Rights and the Developing Law at 13-14. 
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It is arguable that adults should be able to access the procedure for violations committed 
during their childhood. Italy was the only country to raise the question of temporality and 
asked what happens in the event that the violation complained of occurred in childhood, but 
is presented as a complaint when the complainant is older 18 years of age? It would seem 
that this question was left hanging.  I would submit that such cases should be heard. Why 
subject children in this case to a limitation that is not imposed in essence on adult victims 
of the same violations? Since the victim remains one in the same individual, the violation 
occurs as a child but the effects do not end with childhood, the procedure should be flexible 
in this regard.  Does this then mean that the CRC Committee would be capable of hearing a 
child-sexual assault claim posed by an individual aged 50, for instance? It may be argued 
that a time-limit should be placed on such cases.  On the face of it, I would submit this 
should not be a problem, and such a provision in the OP would demonstrate that the CRC is 
committed to condemning the violations against children. However, if such a time-limit is 
deemed necessary, than it would be no problem for the CRC Committee to adopt a 
“continuing violation” approach (similar to that of the HRC in Lovelace v. Canada) 
whereby if the violation has continuing effects into adulthood, then it should be capable of 
adjudication by the CRC Committee. 
 
There are a number of practical reasons why this approach should be adopted. Many 
children may only become aware in their adulthood that a violation has occurred when they 
were young or only as an adult do they have the capacity to set the litigious wheels in 
motion. In any case, by the time the slow-moving machinery of domestic and international 
remedies reaches their conclusion in the Committee, the complainant may very well be an 
adult. The low reported usage of the existing treaty-body system by children may be partly 
because they become adults by the time they register a case.
132
 Scientific research is also 
                                                 
132 See for example, C. v Australia  (1998)  which was submitted on behalf of author's son (aged 14 years of 
age at time of events) as inadmissible.  The Committee held that: “As to admissibility, the State party argues 
that the author lacks standing to present the communication. The State party points out that the author's 
son was 18 years old at the time the communication was submitted, and that in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances, the author's son ought either to have presented the communication himself or expressly 
authorized his mother to submit the communication as his representative. In the absence of any such 
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increasingly discovering the ways in which childhood maltreatment affects an individual 
physically, mentally and emotionally, “with those impacts often extending well into old 
age, if the victim does not receive the right help … The child is the victim, yet the 
processing of the violation can be a life-long struggle for the adult.”133 Such adult-inclusive 
jurisdiction would also potentially improve and expand the jurisprudence of the Committee 
and increase the deterrent effect of its rulings. As to the nature of the victim, the provision 
in an OP could therefore state something to this effect: 
Communications may be submitted by or on behalf of an individual or groups of 
individuals, within the jurisdiction of a State Party, claiming to be victims of a 
violation of any of the rights set forth in the Convention by that State Party during 
their childhood, up to the age of 18. 
7.3 Anonymity of the child applicant 
Existing complaints procedures do not permit victims to remain anonymous. Thus 
applications which are pursuing the rights of an individual child under other treaty bodies 
have to name the child as applicant, and where the child is regarded as having capacity, to 
indicate that they have given their consent to the application being made.  A protocol to the 
CRC should potentially include an identity-suppression provision – that the identity of the 
child would not be revealed except with the child’s express consent.134 
7.4 Best interests of child and consent 
Recalling the debates in the realm of moral philosophy of children‟s rights, the „interest of 
the child‟ is a paternalistic model whereby adults – representatives, the judiciary – exercise 
judgments as to what is objectively in the child‟s best interests.  Eekelaar‟s critique on this 
point is pertinent: that this objective test should be supplemented with an additional 
                                                                                                                                                    
authorization or exceptional circumstances, the communication accordingly is said to be inadmissible 
ratione personae.'' 
133 ASCA Media Release, ‘ASCA Seeks Global Change for child abuse victims and adult survivors through 
submission to Australian human Rights Commission Consultation,’ 15 June 2009. 
134 See the similar provision in Article 14(6)(a) in CERD and CEDAW Article 6(1) respectively. 
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“dynamic self-determination” principle.135  Article 3 of the CRC explicitly sets out the 
„best interests‟ model of protecting the rights of children; however, there would seem to be 
no reason why the CRC Committee could not adopt additional elements as part of their 
interpretation of this principle.  The question thus arises, as to what is the nature and 
content of this article, in the drafting of an OP to give life to this provision, as it were. 
Would it function merely as a guiding principle – an overriding, general rule, like the 
principle of non-discrimination – that is to be read into all of the other provisions of the 
CRC?
136
  Or is article 3 also a substantive stand-alone provision, capable of being raised in 
its own right, without reference to any of the other rights listed in the Convention?  This is 
a question that would need to be addressed in the drafting of the OP.   
7.5 Representation 
In terms of procedural requirements, a major concern with a complaints procedure would 
be to ensure that the access to justice being granted to the child is genuine, and not abused 
by representatives of the child.  This was a concern expressed by members of the Working 
Group to the extent that it was suggested that children only should be able to complain to 
the CRC Committee.  This view is perhaps not as simplistic as it is naïve. Children already 
have access to representation to appear before the other treaty bodies and a restriction of 
this existing right would have to be strongly justified.  
 
This issue is perhaps best addressed in the drafting. There are safeguards can easily be 
implemented in the OP to the CRC, with one significant element being the use of the „best 
interests of the child‟ – one of the guiding principles of the CRC – where the child is not 
able to consent due to age or other reason, as a standard to be applied.   Thus the 
substantive wording of a provision might look like the following:  
 
                                                 
135
 See Section 3.3.1 above. 
136 Cf article 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights: a stand-alone non-discrimination provision 
that is not capable of being the basis of a complaint in its own right, but can only be tacked onto other 
provisions in the said Convention. 
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Where a communication is submitted on behalf of an individual or group of 
individuals, this shall be with the individual‟s consent unless the author can justify 
acting on their behalf without such consent, in which case the Committee shall 
consider whether it is in the best interests of the child or children concerned to 
consider the communication.
137
 
The representation of children is also not a novel concept for advocates and the judiciary in 
a number of domestic jurisdictions. For instance, the issue arises in the Northern American 
context whereby children are represented by state authorities in cases of care and custody. 
Echoing both autonomy and interest-based theories of child‟s rights, one advocate 
highlights the distinction, for example, between the “expressed interest of the child” 
namely the child‟s own interest as represented by her own lawyer, as opposed to the 
“protected interests of the child” typically argued by the lawyer appointed as a guardian.138    
However, it cannot go unnoted that in opposition to the usual relationship between 
international human rights norms and domestic practice, the CRC has demonstrated a 
different relationship between international and national approaches whereby children‟s 
rights have “moved significantly ahead of domestic law in this domain.”139 Thus, the 
drafters need not be entirely constrained by domestic procedures and practice in 
formulating an effective, child-friendly and focused complaint mechanism for children. 
The ambiguity surrounding the concept of the best interests of the child is perhaps the 
strongest reason in favour of having it judicially tested and applied by the quasi-judicial 
body that is the CRC Committee.   
 
Thus, any persons representing the child (as the victim) would have to demonstrate and 
satisfy this test in order for the complaint to be admissible before the CRC Committee.  
Consequently, the heads of complaint would have to address the concerns of the victim-
                                                 
137 Taken from the Text of Draft Optional Protocol to provide a communications procedure, by the NGO 
Advocacy Group (February 2008).  
138 Lewis Pitts, 'The Right to Be Heard: The Child as a Legal Person', in Kathleen Alaimo and Brian Klug (eds.), 
Children as Equals: Exploring the Rights of the Child (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1992), 165-
82 at 172. 
139 Alston, Children, Rights, and the Law at vi. 
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child, as opposed to the rights of the representative parent, lawyer or otherwise.  This 
would avoid manipulation of the child, in such cases as those brought before the HRC by 
parents, in custody cases, where the parent-author claimed to be representing the child, 
whilst in fact the child‟s interest was only invoked to bolster the parent‟s claim.  
 
As a safeguard, the CRC Committee may be required to check with the child (subject to her 
understanding) that a complaint submitted on her behalf reflects her views and that she 
wishes the author to act on her behalf. In cases where it is decided that the complainant-
author is not submitting the claim on the child‟s behalf, consideration would need to be 
given as to whether the Committee still has discretion to consider the complaint. The 
protocol could also allow the possibly for different representatives. 
7.6 Collective Complaints 
Collective complaints can provide a complaints mechanism to the CRC with real difference 
and bite.  Although not being possible before other treaty bodies, this novel procedure 
would seem to be supported primarily by the language employed by the Convention.  An 
analysis of the terminology used in the CRC has provided incongruous results, being seen 
as either positive in advancing children‟s rights, or conversely as immobilizing them.  For 
example, the use of the word “child” as a singular noun in the title of the Convention has 
been seen to render children invisible, despite its near universal ratification.
140
  Some 
advocates, argues Abramson, “have picked up on the plural usage in the CRC, using „the 
child‟ as a collective word, often turning it into the personification, The Child,” the result 
of which is to “treat 2.5 billion people as an object.”141  This is seen then, as yet another 
“double‟ standard” as no similar treatment exists in the other fundamental international 
                                                 
140 Bruce Abramson, 'The Invisibility of Children and Adolscents: The Need to Monitor Our Rhetoric and Our 
Attitudes', in Eugeen Verhellen (ed.), Monitoring Children's Rights (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1996), 393-402. 
141 Ibid. at 397. 
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human rights treaties.
142
  However, on the other hand, this very usage of “the child” has 
been appraised by another writer as facilitating the unique way in which the CRC can be 
used to represent both the individual child‟s interests, and that of the collective – neither 
being mutually exclusive: 
 
[W]hile I am entirely in favour of collective analysis of the situation of children and of 
collective action for children‟s rights, I do not like the idea of losing the capacity to 
defend the individual child […] these two are not mutually exclusive.  The language of 
the Convention is clear on that point […]: “the child” may have individual and 
collective meaning at the same time.  When legal action is taken, I think each 
individual can be an example for many others of how to defend a child‟s rights.143 
Thus, according to this line of reasoning, there would seem to be nothing in the general 
interpretation of the CRC as an instrument per se, to prevent collective complaints 
procedures on behalf of the “the child”.  A collective complaints procedure – as initially 
envisaged by the drafters of the original OP to the CEDAW – would considerably broaden 
the accessibility of the complaints procedure to the CRC, which would be available to 
children (or their representatives) who can show they are victims of the alleged violations, 
to those who find it daunting because of procedural issues or fear of reprisals, such as 
children. 
  
                                                 
142 As opposed to the formulations: ‘The Universal Declaration of the Rights of the Human,’ ‘Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against the Woman,’ or the ‘Convention on the Rights of the 
Person with Disabilities.’ This form is seen as objectifying and thereby essentialising the subject of the 
treaty.   
143 Ferran Casas, 'Monitoring Children's Rights and Monitoring Childhood: Different Tasks?', in Eugeen 
Verhellen (ed.), Monitoring Children's Rights (The Hauge: Kluwer Law International, 1996), 49-56 at 54. 
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8 Conclusion 
“Human rights discourse is powerful.  Decisions are made and lives are affected through its 
doctrinal, institutional, and rhetorical structures.”144 
 
My purpose in this thesis was two-fold: to strengthen the philosophical underpinnings of 
children‟s rights in international human rights law, which I have undertaken with reference 
to the broader notions embedded in rights theories.  In so doing, I hope to have 
demonstrated that the Convention is only just a beginning and that “those who wish to see 
the status of and lives of children improved must continue the search for the moral 
foundation of children‟s rights. Without such thinking there would not have been a 
Convention: without further critical insight there will be no further recognition of the 
importance to children‟s lives of according them rights.”145  Secondly, in arguing for the 
need for an optional protocol to the CRC, I have assumed what Karen Engle famously 
entitled a doctrinalist position, working “under the assumption that positive human rights 
law is authoritative, thereby reflecting a belief that there are no limitations to the 
discourse.”  The limitations to the effectiveness of human rights to address the betterment 
of children‟s lives is perhaps for another paper, but, as the doctrinalist position continues, 
having once “accept[ed] the enforcement gap, they accept that the discourse is limited in its 
ability to effectuate change, and they turn to strategies for making the law work.”146 This is 
an attempt to strategise.  I have worked from within the „core‟ of the human rights 
framework – I have not discussed the tensions inherent in that said system, between 
                                                 
144 Engle, 'International Human Rights and Feminism: When Discourses Meet', at 607. 
145
 Freeman, 'Taking Children's Rights More Seriously', at 69. 
146 Engle, 'International Human Rights and Feminism: When Discourses Meet', at 606. 
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discourse and practice and the challenges thus posed for protecting the interests of children, 
as opposed to other systems and discourses. Indeed, as highlighted by Engle, “The struggle 
to uphold the validity of human rights theory, law, or discourse in the face of what look like 
huge flaws is common.”147 Though not explicitly attempting to „uphold its validity‟ as a 
discourse in the face of all of its inconsistencies and problems in this thesis, I have 
nonetheless assumed that it is possible to work to improve the protection afforded by 
international human rights law, to children.  In short, this is my attempt to patch: 
 
The gaps between the core and the periphery and law and reality convince us that 
something is wrong.  So we continually seek to fill or at least patch the gaps, generally 
with material from the core […] We sense that our work at the periphery can only 
succeed if we can save the core and so, for the most part, we defend it.
148
 
The CRC fills important gaps, and is progressive in the protection of the human rights of 
children.  One can “note in this regard that global human rights instruments were not drawn 
up with children in mind, that they have been developed over a period of decades, and that 
as a whole they therefore contain a number of inconsistencies and certainly do not reflect 
current knowledge and experience with regard to children‟s issues.”  Any new instrument, 
here an OP to the CRC, should thus be drafted view a view to alleviating the 
inconsistencies in the treatment of the rights of children in the international human rights 
discourse, so that they do not fall prey to the same fate as those of women, as acutely 
described by Engle, whereby we “have fought hard to end injustices in the world with tools 
that are either unable or unwilling to repair the injustices.  And yet, we continue the fight.”   
It is with this in mind that the need for children to be able to seek remedies pursuant to this 
distinctive instrument should be evaluated carefully – with a firm grounding and 
understanding at the theoretical levels with a view to sharpening the legal tools, the teeth of 
the CROC – and this evaluation should be a dynamic and ongoing process, as opposed to 
defining children‟s rights with respect to a particular moment in history.  
                                                 
147 Ibid. at 610. 
148 Ibid. at 604-5. 
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13/… Open-ended Working Group on an optional protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child to provide a communications procedure 
  
 The Human Rights Council, 
 
Recalling Human Rights Council resolution 11/1 of 17 June 2009 on the Open-ended 
Working Group on an optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child to 
provide a communications procedure,  
 
Recalling also General Assembly resolution 64/146 of 18 December 2009 on the rights of 
the child, 
 
Bearing in mind paragraph 33 (p) of General Assembly resolution 64/146, in which the 
Assembly called upon States to ensure that child-sensitive procedures were made available 
to children and their representatives so that children had access to means of facilitating 
effective remedies for any breaches of any of their rights arising from the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child through independent advice, advocacy and complaint procedures, 
including justice mechanisms, and that their views were heard when they were involved or 
their interests were concerned in judicial or administrative procedures in a manner 
consistent with the procedural rules of national law, 
 
Noting with interest general comment No. 5 (2003) of the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child, in which the Committee emphasized that children‟s special and dependent status 
creates real difficulties for them in pursuing remedies for breaches of their rights, and 
general comment No. 12 (2009), in which the Committee stated that the right of all children 
to be heard and taken seriously constitutes one of the fundamental values of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, 
 
Recalling the view of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, expressed by its 
Chairperson in her oral report to the General Assembly at its sixty-third session, that the 
development of a communications procedure for the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
would significantly contribute to the overall protection of children‟s rights, 
 
1. Takes note of the report on its first session, held in Geneva from 16 to 18 December 
2009, of the Open-ended Working Group established under Human Rights Council 
resolution 11/1 to explore the possibility of elaborating an optional protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child to provide a communications procedure 
complementary to the reporting procedure under the Convention (A/HRC/13/43); 
 
 C 
2. Decides to extend the mandate of the Open-ended Working Group until the seventeenth 
session of the Council, and also decides that the Open-ended Working Group shall meet for 
up to 10 working days and report to the Council not later than at its seventeenth session; 
 
3. Also decides to mandate the Open-ended Working Group to elaborate an optional 
protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child to provide a communications 
procedure and, in this regard, requests the Chairperson of the Open-ended Working Group 
to prepare a proposal for a draft optional protocol, taking into account the views expressed 
and inputs provided during the first session of the Working Group in December 2009 and 
giving due regard to the views of the Committee on the Rights of the Child and, where 
appropriate, to the views of relevant United Nations special procedures and other experts, 
to be circulated by September 2010 in all the official languages of the United Nations, with 
the proposal for the draft optional protocol to be used as a basis for the forthcoming 
negotiations; 
 
4. Further decides to invite a representative of the Committee on the Rights of the Child to 
participate in the Open-ended Working Group as a resource person and, where appropriate, 
relevant United Nations special procedures and other relevant independent experts; 
 
5. Requests the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to 
update and publish the report of the Secretary-General on the comparative summary of 
existing communications and inquiry procedures and practices under international human 
rights instruments and under the United Nations system, published on 22 November 2004 
(E/CN.4/2005/WG.23/2), and to present that report to the Council at its fifteenth session; 
 
6. Requests the Secretary-General and the Office of the High Commissioner to continue to 
provide the Open-ended Working Group with the assistance necessary for the fulfilment of 
its mandate, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 64/245 of 24 December 2009 
on special subjects relating to the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2010–
2011. 
 
